Jayasena s Proof of the Authenticity Of

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  1  Jayasena’s proof of the authenticity of Mah !  y ! na, and the discussions in East Asia Shigeki Moro (Hanazono University, Kyoto) Introduction A major debate among the Mah !  y ! na Buddhists was regarding whether Mah !  y ! na was the teaching of Buddha. We can find some efforts to prove the authenticity of Mah !  y ! na in the Yog ! c ! ra treatises 1 , such as Mah !  y ! nas tr  ! lamk ! ra 2  and Vasubandhu’s Vy ! khy !  yukti 3 . Chengweishilun     quoted Mah !  y ! na sutras to prove the existence of ! laya-vijñ ! na , and cited some Yog ! c ! ra treatises to prove the authenticity of these Mah !  y ! na sutras 4 . According to Yinmin-ruzhengli-lun-shu     (Commentary on Ny !  ya-prave  #  a ), Ji   (632-682), one of the famous disciples of Xuanzang  , introduced Asvabh ! va’s   inference to prove that Mah !  y ! na was expounded by Buddha. Furthermore he introduced the criticism of Asvabh ! va’s proof by Jayasena, who was a Yog ! c ! ra master in India: [Asvabh ! va’s commentary of] Mah !  y ! nasa $  graha  states: [ Thesis :] All Mah !  y ! na sutras are the words of Buddha (* buddhavacana ). [ Reason :] Because all [of them] do not contradict the theory of selflessness of person (*  pudgala-nair  ! tmaya ). [Example:] As with Ekottar  !  gama . 5  This contains a fallacy of either [untrue] (* anayatara-asiddha ), [when it is claimed] against other schools, since they do not accept that Mah !  y ! na do not contradict the theory of selflessness of person, because of the theory of permanence and self [and bliss and purity] of Mah !  y ! na. Although [other schools] accepted that [all Mah !  y ! na sutras] do not contradict [the theory of selflessness of person], there would be a fallacy of uncertainty, because the six treatises of the Sarv ! stiv ! da school (  ) also do not contradict [the theory of selflessness of person]. However, there was a Buddhist layman of great distinction. […] Master Jayasena. [He took] more than forty years to establish the following proof: All Mah !  y ! na sutras are the words of the Buddha. -- [This is] the thesis. Because they are not included in what are accepted as not being Buddha’s words by both [proponents and opponents]. -- [This is] the reason. As with the !  gamas  such as Ekottar  !  gama . -- [This is] the example. The commentary [of this formula] is included in [Jayasena’s] Weishi jueze shi    . [The reason why Jayasena revised Asvabh ! va’s formula into] “not included in what are accepted as not being Buddha’s words by both” is that “not included in what are accepted as not being Buddha’s words by both proponents and opponents” means “not included in the treatises of non-Buddhists and the six treatises of the Sarv ! stiv ! da or so.” This revision was popular [among the scholars] for a while, and no one criticized it. (T44, 121b) 1  N ! g ! rjuna ( Ratnaval %  ), Bh ! viveka ( Madhyamakah &  daya  and Bhavya’s commentary), Jianyi    ( Ru-dacheng-lun    ), ! ntideva ( Bodhicary ! vat  ! ra ) and Haribhadra (  Abhisamay ! la $ k ! r  ! lok ! ) also discussed on this topic, according to Fujita 2011. # take 2003 regards Jianyi as an Indian Yog ! c ! ra master. It should be noted that Abhidharma Buddhists also tried to prove that Abhidharma was the Buddha’s words (Honj $  1989). 2  N $ nin 2009. 3  Horiuchi 2009. 4  Takeuchi 1992. 5  The orginal formula of Asvabh ! va’s commentary is as follows: [ Thesis :] The Mah !  y ! na sutras are truly the words of Buddha. [ Reason :] Because all [of them] don’t contradict [the theory of] selflessness of person. [ Example :] As with the discourses of the momentariness and so forth. (T32, 396c)  2  Jayasena’s formula is similar to the third proof of Mah !  y ! nas tr  ! lamk ! ra , which argues that the Mah !  y ! na sutras are the words of Buddha as non-Buddhists’ ( t  %  rthika ) treatises (  #!  stra ) have no teachings like Mah !  y ! na 6 . In this quotation, Ji introduced Xuanzang’s criticism of Jayasena’s proof: My master [Xuanzang] reached him and criticized this [revision]:  Sarv ! stiv ! da accepts *  Abhidharma-jñ ! na-prasth ! na-  #!  stra  (  ;  AJPS ) by itself as the Buddha’s words. Furthermore,  AJPS  is not included in what are accepted as not being Buddha’s words by both other H % nay ! nists and Mah !  y ! nists. How can you, the Mah !  y ! nists, accept  AJPS  as the Buddha’s words? Who can accept that the Mah !  y ! na sutras are not included in what are accepted as not being Buddha’s words by both? They are included in what are accepted as not being Buddha’s words by all H % nay ! nists and non-Buddhists. Only Mah !  y ! nists accept that [the Mah !  y ! na sutras are] not included in it. This [revised] reason contains a fallacy of either [untrue] (* anayatara-asiddha ). When  AJPS  is [the subject of] the thesis, the thesis would have the fallacy of contradicting [Mah !  y ! nists’] own tenets (*  sva  #!  stra-viruddha ) and the reason would have the fallacy of both being untrue (* ubhay !  siddha ). […] Therefore, my master [Xuanzang] corrected his reason: “Because they are not included in what are accepted as not being Buddha’s words by [the proponent = Mah !  y ! nist] himself (  ).” [This reason can] exclude  AJPS  and so forth [from consideration], as they are not accepted by [the proponent = Mah !  y ! nist] himself, and [the revised formula] has no fallacies. (T44, 121b-c) Based on this tradition, there have been much discussions of Jayasena’s proof and Xuanzang’s criticism in East Asia. Jayasena’s proof has been called Shengjun biliang / Sh '  gun hiry '     and has been studied along with Xuanzang’s criticism, which has been valued as a Xunazang’s contribution to Buddhist logic 7 . These discussions have been conducted mainly by East Asian Yog ! c ! ra scholars. Some specialized works were written by scholar monks of the Hoss $     school (the Japanese transmission of the Yog ! c ! ra school), such as Ganken   (-848-) Sh '  gun-hiry '  jikki    , Z $ shun   (1104-1180) Sh '  gun-hiry '   sh '    , Ry $ san   (1170-1218?) Sh '  gun-hiry '  kai’in    , or so. Unlike India, there were few so-called “H % nay ! nists” in East Asia. Thus, the purpose of the interpretation of Jayasena’s proof for East Asian Yog ! c ! ra Buddhists might necessarily be quite different from that in the Indian context. Here, I would like to focus on the debates on  Jayasena’s proof and examine the meanings of the proof of Mah !  y ! na authenticity in each context. Jayasena Records of Jayasena are only found in the East Asian sources. According to the Great Tang Dynasty Record of the Western Regions    , Xuanzang reported the fame and activities of  Jayasena in India: In the Stick Wood (* Ya  ()  i ), recently, there was an up !  saka  named Jayasena (Shengjun in Chinese), who was a man of the k  ( atriya  of West India. His inclination was plain, and he preferred to live in the mountains and forests. Although he stayed in the world of illusion, his mind traveled the state of reality. He learned in the subtle meanings of Buddhist and non-Buddhist texts. His arguments were noble and lofty, and his manner was peaceful and elegant. Many & rama ' as, Brahmans, non-Buddhist scholars, kings, ministers, and wealthy and powerful persons approached him to ask for his instruction. His disciples were found in six rooms out of ten. 6  See N $ nin 2009, 50-51. Sthiramati and Asvabh ! va wrote the commentaries of Mah !  y ! nas tr  ! lamk ! ra . Sthiramati was one of Jayasena’s teachers as stated below, and Asvabh ! va’s name can be found in the quotation above. Jayasena might succeed the discussion of Mah !  y ! nas tr  ! lamk ! ra . 7  See Han Tingjie 1999.  3 When he was already seventy years old, he became absorbed in reading tirelessly. He gave up all other subjects of learning and engaged himself solely in the study of Buddhist scriptures with mental and physical exertion, both during the daytime as well as at night. In India it is a custom to make miniature stupas five or six inches high with scented clay. Hand-copied sutras are put inside these stupas, which are known as * dharma  #  ar  %  ra . When a large number of such stupas is accumulated, a great stupa is constructed to contain them all for perpetual veneration. This was Jayasena’s duty. While his mouth preached the wonderful dharma to teach his disciples, his hands made stupas to accumulate supreme bliss. At night, he practiced meditative walking, chanting sutras, seated meditation, and thinking. Having no time to sleep or eat, he never relaxed either in the daytime or at night. Even when he was one hundred years old, he did not slacken his aim and effort. In a period of thirty years he made seven ko )  i  (one hundred million in Chinese) * dharma  #  ar  %  ra  stupas. Each time he completed one  ko )  i  of stupas, he constructed a great stupa to contain all of them and make a prosperous Buddhist service inviting many monks to celebrate it. On each occasion, a divine light shone brightly and a miracle appeared explicitly. After that, a light issued from time to time. (T51, 920a-b)  8   According to the Biography of the Tripi )  aka Master of the Great Ci’en Monastery of the Great Tang Dynasty    , Jayasena was an Indian lay Buddhist scholar who had learned hetu-vidy !  from Bhadraruci, ‘  #  abda-vidy !   and treatises of Mah !  y ! na and H % nay ! na’ from Sthiramati, and Yog ! c  ! rabh mi  from S % labhadra, as well as other non-Buddhist studies. Xuanzang stayed with Jayasena for two years, studied Weishi-jueze-lun    , Mah !  y ! nas tr  ! lamk ! ra  and so forth under him and asked him questions about Yog ! c  ! rabh mi  and hetu-vidy !  (Buddhist logic) (T50, 244a) 9 . East Asian Yog ! c ! ra texts contain references to Jayasena’s theories. According to Chengweishilun , there are two doctrines on the srcin of seeds   ( b %   ja ) in the ! layavijñ ! na : the inherent seeds   and the newly perfumed seeds   (T31, 8a-b). Ji’s commentary on Chengweishilun  states that the second theory was posited by Nanda  , who was a teacher of Jayasena (T43, 305a). Jayasena is also quoted in the context of the theory of seeds 10 . In his commentary of Renwang-jing     ( Sutra for Humane Kings ), Woncheuk   (613-696) introduces Jayasena’s theory of arising (*  j ! ti ) and abiding (*  sthiti ) dharma; Jayasena claims that arising occurs before abiding, while Dharmap ! la says that these two occurs at the same time (T33, 382b). In both cases, Jayasena’s theories were often contrasted with those of Dharmap ! la, whose position has been considered as the standard by the Faxiang/Hoss $  school. As previously mentioned, however, Jayasena studied under S % labhadra, a successor of Dharmap ! la. In other words, he was a senior fellow pupil of Xuanzang. It is not enough to simply regard Jayasena as an opponent of Dharmap ! la and his followers, such as Xuanzang and Ji. It is reasonable to suppose that Xuanzang criticized Jayasena in the similar manner as Jayasena criticized Asvabh ! va in order to obtain a more satisfying proof of the authenticity of Mah !  y ! na. Wonhyo’s Criticism Inmy ' -daisho-sh '     of Z $ shun quotes a fragment from Pan-biryang-non     ( Critical Discussion of Inference ) written by Wonhyo   (618-686), which criticizes Xuanzang’s correction of Jayasena’s proof mentioned above: Pan-biryang-non   writes: Dharma master Jayasena demonstrated the proof [as follows]: [ Thesis :] All Mah !  y ! na sutras are the words of the Buddha. [ Reason :] Because they are not included in what are accepted as not being Buddha’s words 8  I used Li Rongxi 1996 for translation. 9  Xuanzang’s biographies should be used with caution as they were changing between before and after his death. See Moro 2015. 10  See Ji’s commentary on  Yog ! c  ! rabh mi , Yuqieshidilun lüezuan     (T43, 129a-130a, 177c-178a).  4 by both [proponents and opponents]. [Example:] As with the !  gamas . H % nay ! nists would make [an inference to show] the fallacy of being uncertain (* anaik ! ntika ), because  AJPS  (  ) is not included in what are accepted as not being Buddha’s words by both [proponents and opponents], and you do not accept [  AJPS ] as Buddha’s words. Katy !  y ! na’s sutra (  ) is accepted as Buddha’s words by Sarv ! stiv ! da, while Sautr ! ntika and Mah !  y ! na claim [that it is] not Buddha’s words. Following from this, [Jayasena’s proof] cannot avoid being a fallacy. To escape this fallacy, Tripi ( aka master Xuanzang revised the reason to “because they are not included in what are accepted as not being Buddha’s words by [the proponent] himself (  ).” In this way, [Jayasena’s proof] could avoid the fallacy of being uncertain. Now, I state that this [revised] reason causes [the fallacy of] confirmation of a contradiction (* viruddha-avyabhic  ! rin ): [ Thesis :] No Mah !  y ! na sutras are authoritative valid cognition [   the words of the Buddha]. [ Reason :] Because they are not included in what are accepted as Buddha’s words by [the proponent] himself. [Example:] As with the [teachings of] Vai & e ) ika. Moreover, this new reason has [the fallacy of] being uncertain: As with Ekottar  !  gama , because they are not included in what are accepted as not being Buddha’s words by [the proponent] himself, are all Mah !  y ! na sutras included in authoritative valid cognition? Or, as with shape and color (* r   pa ), odor (*  gandha ) or so, because they are not included in what are accepted as not being Buddha’s words by [the proponent] himself, are all Mah !  y ! na sutras not authoritative valid cognition? Accordingly, I now correct (  ) Jayasena’s proof as follows: [ Thesis :] All Mah !  y ! na sutras are consistent with the true theory. [ Reason :] Because they are the teachings which are not included in what are accepted as not being Buddha’s words by both [proponents and opponents]. [Example:] As with Ekottar  !  gama . In this way, [the proof] can escape from [the fallacy of] confirmation of a contradiction (* viruddha-avyabhic  ! rin ) and the first and second [examples] of [the fallacy of] being uncertain. (T68, 549c-550a) It should be noted that Wonhyo made an important change of the thesis from “the words of the Buddha” to “the true theory.” The words of the Buddha must be the true theory, but not all the true theory might be preached by Buddha(s). The srcinal purpose of these proofs seemed to be enfeebled by this change. It is likely that Wonhyo’s criticism was based not only on an awareness of the logical problems of Xuanzang’s revision, but also on a critical attitude toward the new Yog ! c ! ra theories introduced by Xuanzang. Although we now have only some fragments of Pan-biryang-non , more than half of them include the topics listed below 11 : 1.   Criticism of the proof of the four-part model of cognition (the eighth topic of Pan-biryang-non 12 ). 2.   Criticism of the existence of ! laya-vijñ ! na  in Asvabh ! va’s commentary of 11  Other topics include: (1) a discussion on the Pure land (the seventh topic, which is missing the first half), (2) two metalogical problems (the eleventh and twelfth topics) and (3) a discussion on  Chengweishilun  (the fourteenth topic, which is missing the latter half). 12  The seventh to fourteenth topics are found in the manuscript of Pan-biryang-non  previously owned by Kanda Kiichir $  (See Fukihara 1967) and now owned by Otani University, Kyoto.
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